How is the non-farm payroll tracking the most complete data?

The BLS released Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) data for the second quarter of 2013 this morning. Since it's based on the unemployment insurance system's records, it offers near-universal coverage of the job market (as opposed to the monthly payroll survey, which is just a sample, though a very large one). It shows that total employment grew 1.6% in the year ending in June, compared with 1.7% reported by the monthly payroll numbers. This is a reversal of the last release, which had the QCEW growing 0.1 point more than the payroll survey. But an 0.1 point difference in either direction is trivial, and confirms that the payroll survey is doing a good job at tracking this weird recovery/expansion.

Earnings figures in the QCEW are difficult to compare with the monthly payroll numbers, since the definitions and coverage are different, and the series is not seasonally adjusted. They showed a 6.9% decline in wages from the first quarter to the second, following a 1.1% decline from 2012Q4 to 2013Q1. Quarterly declines are normal in the first and second quarters in the QCEW earnings series, but the second quarter decline is larger than normal (the first quarter was quite close to average).

Finally, the number of employing establishments rose 0.7% for the year ending in the second quarter, a decline from the 2.0% gain in the first. The trend, however, is working its way slowly higher after the sharp (and unprecedented since the series began in 1976) decline in establishments during the Great Recession. The pace of startups is well below the 2-3% average of the 1980s and 1990s, and even the 1.7-1.8% average of the mid-2000s. Establishment formation is extremely important to employment growth, since young firms are the primary creators of new jobs. So this is good news for continued employment gains, but offers little hope for an acceleration in the pace of job growth over the next year or two.

The start-up bust: it’s credit and the housing collapse in the short term; education, health insurance and immigration in the long

Young firms, not small firms, make an outsized contribution to job growth here in the U.S., and the ongoing decline in start-up activity has taken a lot of the fizz out of the U.S. job market. We've gathered some research that considers why creative destruction in the business world has lost its creative half, a serious and ongoing issue for our workforce

In a presentation at a November 2012 IMF research conference, Teresa Fort, John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin and Javier Miranda note that between 2006 and 2009 employment growth in firms less than 5 years old with fewer than 20 employees fell from 26.6% to 8%, while employment in businesses more than 5 years old with more than 500 employees fell from 2.8% to -3.9%, narrowing the differential from 23.7% to 12.5%. They note that many of the hypotheses concerning why small firms are more sensitive to credit conditions apply more accurately to young firms and start-ups because they don’t have access to commercial paper and corporate bonds, and instead rely on their own finances to get started including, you guessed it, home mortgages. Specifically, they found that the housing price shock in California explains 2/3s of narrowing of the growth rate differential noted above, found like patterns in other states with severe housing price declines, and did not find them in states that did not experience such declines.

In a related paper, the same team, sans Ms. Fort, found that the largest declines in the share of employment accounted for by young firms (declines ranging from 11.8 to 14.3%) occurred to California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona and Idaho, while the second tier (declines of 7.1 to 11.8%) were wider spread, but included Florida, Oregon, Wyoming, and Michigan. So, all front-line housing bust states are all in the top tiers.

 …and housing bust

 The authors note the work of Atif Mian and Amir Sufi on aggregate demand at the state level, and note that the decline in housing prices cuts both into self-financing, and into local demand. A San Francisco Fed paper released yesterday authored by Mian and Sufi using state-level National Federation of Independent Businesses data finds a strong correlation between the decline in the employment-population ratio between 2007 and 2009 and the 20pp increase in businesses citing poor sales as their biggest problem. (The percentage citing credit conditions barely moved, which struck the authors, and us, as odd.) 

They looked at household-leverage and found that the percentage of businesses citing weak sales rose more in states with higher household leverage, where largest declines in spending and employment catering to local customers took place as well. And although the percentage of small business owners reporting regulation and red tape as their biggest problem rose between 2008 and 2011, the increase was inconsistent across states—Rhode Island reported a rise of over 30pp while that measure fell by 10pp in New Jersey—and the states where the complaints about regulation and taxes rose the most also experienced the strongest employment growth, although the correlation was not statistically significant.

The weakness in start-up activity since the Great Recession is no mystery. 

longer-term issues

 But what about the long if less dramatic decline since the 1980s? Of course there are many factors, including concentration of power in major corporations, barriers to entry, and outsourcing, especially of manufacturing activity, and we have identified a few other trends that have gotten less attention.

 First there is a well-documented relationship between education and entrepreneurship: as of 2007, 28% of the overall US population had attained a bachelor’s degree or higher, but 48% of business owners with paid employees had bachelor’s degrees or higher. Between 1980 and 2010 both overall job growth and educational attainment have slowed from their 1950–1980 rates. Metro areas with smaller education gaps (the difference between the years of education required by the average posted job openings and the ears of education attained by the average worker in that area) have significantly lower unemployment rates for well and poorly educated workers alike. The decline in job growth/ed attainment coincides with the decline in start-up activity. 

 Second, in a paper in the January 2011 issue of The Journal of Health Economics, Robert W. Fairlie, Kanika Kapur, and Susan Gates used CPS panel data to expand on limited research on “entrepreneurship lock,” and found that self-employed business owners are “much less likely” than wage & salary workers, part-time workers and even unemployed workers to have health insurance, and that new business owners have lower rates than those in older businesses. Business creation rates are lower for workers with employer-based heath insurance, and higher for those who have no health insurance, or have insurance through their spouses. They estimate that, for men, this lowers the probability of starting one’s own business by 1% “relative to an annual base business creation rate of 3%.” They conclude that eligibility for Medicare has a lot to do with it: business ownership rates for men increase from 24.6% for those just under 65 to 28% just over 65, but there is no change between the ages of 55 and 75, meaning it’s not just because they reach retirement age. In closing they note that the relatively low rates of business ownership in the US may be related to differences in our health insurance coverage with coverage in other wealthy countries. 

 Third, a disproportionate number of start-ups are founded by skilled immigrants. A Kauffman Foundation study found that a quarter of the science and technology firms founded in the US between 1995 and 2005 were headed up by a foreign-born CEO or lead technician, and that in Silicon Valley the percentage rose to 52%, with Indian immigrants founding one fourth of the start-ups, and immigrants from Britain, China, Taiwan and Japan founding the other fourth. Weakness in our economy has caused a decline in immigration, and although there have been some legislative proposals to award VISAs to those who might want to start a new company here, it doesn’t really work that way. Generally firms are started by entrepreneurs who come here to go to school, work, or for family reasons, about not until they have been in the US for about  10 years. So this is likely to be a persistent problem as well. 

 There is much speculation about tax rates but, although increased tax rates on capital gains may discourage angel investors, David Friend, who has founded six companies in three decades, notes that the marginal tax rate “doesn’t make any difference” to entrepreneurs: they are unlikely to make much in their first few years, and are focused on “hitting it big” in the future, as were Bill Gates and Steve Jobs who braved top income tax rates of 70% when founding their companies.

 

 

 

Public Service Announcement on the Non-farm Payroll

The large upward revisions to August payrolls released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics this morning (with jobs data for September) set the conspiracy theorists' world on fire. And they were strong, about three times the usual revision. But, as we pointed out in a report we sent to our clients earlier this week, this is a long-standing pattern. It almost always happens, whether there's an election coming up or not. Here's the relevant text from this morning's note:

August's gain was revised upward by 46,000, and July's by 40,000. Almost all the revisions, however, came from an upward revision of 101,000 to local government education in August before seasonal adjustment – a recurrent anomaly at this time of year that we wrote about in Wednesday's report. The concurrent seasonal adjustment technique distributes large changes like that backwards, so the gain was split between July and August in the adjusted numbers. Some excitable types are attributing the upward revision to political machinations, but this pattern has been around a long time. It's likely something is amiss in the BLS's collection process, and they are working on it. There shouldn't be a recurrent pattern of error like this. (Excitable types should also note that the birth/death model subtracted 9,000 jobs in September.)

Student Debt: Onerous, and a Drag

We have heard from a number of sources that researchers at the New York Federal Reserve Bank are worried that without some form of mortgage debt relief we may face a crisis in a couple of years that eclipses the one that took place in 2008. In line with such worries, the New York Fed has started collecting previously unavailable data on student debt, a form of indebtedness that’s a major burden on the young, and also more of a macroeconomic drag than many analysts realize. Here are some details on all that.

Runaway Inflation

The rise in college tuition has been relentless, far outpacing the famous rise in the cost of health care (see graph, below). Since 1980, the overall CPI is up 194%. Its medical care component is up 436%, more than twice as much. But its college tuition component is up 829%, more than four times as much.

CPI

It’s hard to put a finger on just what drives educational inflation. No particular category of spending is rising out of line with the averages, though contacts at a number of institutions point to a great fondness for building fancy new buildings, many of them financed with bonds secured by supposedly ever-rising student tuition and fees. This is how NYU, with its relatively small endowment, is financing its grand expansion plans in lower Manhattan. Faculties of both the business school and economics department have filed objections, citing a fearsome growth in leverage. Similar things are going on in public systems, like the University of California’s, despite continued reduction in state financing.

Instructional budgets have remained at a stable 33% of spending for the last decade, even as student/teacher ratios have fallen. The reason that those ratios could fall while the instructional share of budgets has been stable is that universities have squeezed on labor costs. To start with, the composition of faculties has changed markedly—from nearly 80% full-time in 1970 to about 50% today. Over the last decade, student enrollment is up 38%; full-time faculty is up 23%, and part-time is up 63%. But the full-time faculty haven’t been raking it in. Tuition and fees have risen 82% faster than the salaries of full-time faculty since the early 1990s at private institutions, and 149% faster at public ones.

Burdens Shifting to Individuals

At the same time costs have been rising, state governments have cut back their support of public universities and colleges. Some major state universities now get less than 10% of their income from state budgets. As the graph below shows, the personal share of higher ed spending surpassed the state and local share about ten years ago, and the two lines continue to get farther apart. (This data, drawn from the national income accounts, stops in 2010. Given budget cutbacks since then, the gap has undoubtedly gotten wider.) The feds have kicked up their share, but nowhere near enough to offset the decline in the state and local share.

Who-pays

Of course, because of aid, not everyone pays the full published prices. According to the College Board, net costs of public institutions in 2008 were around 44% of household income for the poorest quartile of the population, 26% for the next-poorest, 19% for the second-richest, and 10% for the best off. That’s a lot of money. And more of the aid, at least until very recently, has been coming in the form of loans rather than grants. In the 1970s, loans were 21% of aid; lately, the share has been 47%. Pell Grants, the major federal program, covered 45% of the average public university tuition bill in 1990; in 2011, it covered 32%.

The Great Recession had a major effect on college choice and financing. According to a Sallie Mae/Ipsos survey, college costs—actually paid, not sticker prices—came down in the 2010–2011 school year, especially for higher-income families. (It rose for the poorest quartile, though.) Students traded down, looking for cheaper options (many—at all income levels—shifted from four-year public to two-year public institutions), and grants and scholarships increased (led by increases in Pell Grants from the federal government). More middle-income families applied for financial aid—the product, no doubt, of the recession’s lingering hit to income and balance sheets. Middle- and high-income families increased their use of grants and scholarships, with both dollar levels and shares of costs paid rising over the last couple of years. More middle-income families are applying for aid, and they’re still plenty worried about rising costs.

But a lot of college funds have to be borrowed. According to Sallie Mae/Ipsos, poor families paid 25% of expenses with borrowed funds in the 2010–2011 year. The share declines as you go up the ladder, but not as much as you might think: 22% for the middle ranks, and 17% for the best off. And the trend is towards increasing reliance on loans. In 1992, 32% of undergrads borrowed; in 2007, 53% did.

Heavy Debt Loads

The result has been a relentless increase in education debt. (See graph, below, for a yearly flow picture.) We don’t know exactly how much it’s risen, since there are no official sources of the stock of loans outstanding. A private researcher, Mark Kantrowitz, proprietor of a website called finaid.org, estimates that total student debt has risen from about $200 billion in 2000 to $1 trillion today, but he’s stingy about disclosing his sources and techniques. While the trajectory is probably more or less right, we don’t know for sure.

Loans

More recently, the New York Fed, using data gathered from the credit rating agency Equifax, has been publishing estimates of student debt, which are the closest to definitive we now have. The numbers are staggering. They estimate that as of the third quarter of 2011, total student debt was about $870 billion—more than credit card balances ($693 billion) and auto loans ($730 billion).

Just over 15% of adults have student debt balances. The mean balance is $23,300—but that is pulled up, as most debt aggregates are, but a minority who are deep in debt. The median is only about half the mean: $12,800. A quarter owe more than $28,000, and 10% owe more than 54%.

Although almost all age groups owe student debt, the profile skews young: 40% of people in their 20s are on the hook, compared with just 7% of those over 40. But the numbers don’t go to 0 with age: 5% of over-60s owe student debt.

And since the young have relatively low incomes—on which more in a moment—there’s a lot of distress among the indebted. On the surface, about 10% of those with student debts are in arrears, roughly in line with credit card debt. But since many borrowers are still in school or just out, they’re not yet expected to begin servicing their debts. Adjusting for that, the New York Fed estimates that more than a quarter—27%—of borrowers have past-due balances.

That level of distress, combined with a still-lousy job market, means that today’s young are having a hard time getting on their feet. A just-released survey of recent grads by the Heldrich Center for Workforce Development at Rutgers shows unrelated to their fields of study, and having a hard time making ends meet. Median student debt of recent grads is $20,000—higher than the New York Fed’s figure, no doubt because of the increasing prominence of debt finance. And it’s pinching their spending sharply: 40% have delayed the purchase of a house or car, 28% have put off additional education, 27% have moved back in with their parents, and 14% have delayed marriage. And they have generally gloomy views of their future—personally and especially for their generation as a whole.

A Nonflattering Profile

One of the more established facts in economics is that people’s incomes tend to rise with age to a peak around their early 50s, then decline into retirement and beyond. As with many established facts, recent economic history is challenging this pattern.

Graphed below is average household income in constant dollars by age of household head. In 2010, households headed by someone aged 15–24 had an income of $28,322, 15% less than their counterparts in 1970. All other age groups were better off than their predecessors 40 years earlier, though in general, the younger the cohort, the lesser the advantage. The 65+ set, though, was almost 80% better off than their 1970s counterparts. Today’s young are about 20% worse off than those of 2000. Most other groups are 10–15% worse off than their counterparts at the century’s turn.

Income-age-profiles

That’s not to say that older households are doing swimmingly. In fact, the 35–44s and 45–54s are also worse off than their 1990s ancestors. And economic progress over time is looking to have stalled for the middle ranks. While the 25–34 set in 2010 had incomes 42% above the 15–24 group ten years earlier (presumably, that is, mostly the same people), the 45–54 group was 8% worse off than that cohort was when they were 35–44, and the 55–64 group was worse off.

Only the elderly have been exempt from this stagnation/downward mobility. They’re the only group whose incomes have risen consistently. But before one concludes that they’re rolling in it, the average income of this cohort was $31,408 in 2010, 36% below the national average.

Amid shifting trends and uncertainty, one thing doesn’t change: our young adults are our country’s future. It’s a good thing the NY Fed is paying attention to the burdens our best hopes are carrying.

Recent work on income disparity

Setting the stage

UC Berkeley Economics Professor Emmanuel Saez recently updated his income-share spreadsheets through 2010, using data from the IRS’s Statistics of Income Division. This series includes capital gains, which results in more dramatic swings than one sees in series that exclude them. 

Including capital gains real incomes fell 17.4% between 2007 and 2009, the largest decline since the Great Depression. Within that the incomes of the top 1% were down 36.3%, largely the result of the 74% decline in realized capital gains between 2007 and 2009, while those of the lower 99% were down 11.6%.

Painful for all, indeed, but skewed to the upper income groups, a trend that had more than retraced itself by the end of 2010, the most recent year of IRS data. Between 2009 and 2010 the incomes of the lower 99% rose only 0.2% while the incomes of the top percentile rose 11.6%, meaning that close to all the over-the-year improvement in income, when adjusted for population, was captured by that top percentile, 93% of it to be exact. (See links below for more data.)

That puts some numbers on why the recovery is experienced so differently by ordinary wage earners and by elite income groups, which in turn has surely heightened public awareness of our growing income disparity.

But there’s another big question out there. Whether you’re rooting for the upper or lower percentiles, if you spend a lot of time looking at income distribution tables, you can’t help but wonder why there is so little popular support for redistribution toward the middle classes, especially as the share of income going to the wealthiest citizens has risen toward levels last seen in the Roaring Twenties:

Top-1-share

Piecing together what people think

 In “The American Public Looks at the Rich,” sociologists David Weakliem and Robert Biggert round up a number of opinion polls on the subject taken over the last five decades and suggest some answers.

We’re re-quoting their opening quote because it’s a bit hard to remember that concerns about “tyranny of the majority” related to taxation have a long history. Back in late 19th Century England, as property restrictions on voting weakened, John Stuart Mill fretted, “…is it not a considerable danger lest [the majority] should throw…upon the larger incomes, an unfair share, or even the whole, of the burden of taxation; and having done so, add to the amount without scruple, expending the proceeds of modes supposed to conduce to the profit and advantage of the labouring class?”

Although American workers have fought for wages, unions, and benefits, why a push for inequitable tax burdens (some would say even equitable tax burdens) on the rich feared by Mill and his colleagues has never gained traction remains an open question. After reviewing polling evidence, Weakliem and Biggert note, “There is little support for direct redirection from the rich,” and, “Even the general principle of progressive taxation does not draw clear majority support.”

The paper is thoughtful, even-handed, and a refreshing break from dreary speculation that the lower-income groups are dominated by a disproportionate share of misguided lottery enthusiasts. The comments of the authors suggest a far more complex picture.

For one thing, the authors note that Americans are not opposed to higher taxes on the rich– 59% of respondents to a 2011 poll favored higher rates for families making at least $250K—but they don’t have much faith in the government’s ability to accomplish this. In one poll that inquired about the government’s ability to provide health care, college education, day care, and a few other services, “reducing the difference between the rich and poor” was the only item for which a larger percentage had had “no confidence at all,” rather than “a great deal of confidence.”

One pollster notes that since the 1980s “people have told pollsters that the rich, not themselves, will benefit from budget agreements. It does not seem to matter what the contents of the agreement are or whether they are negotiated by Republicans or Democrats.” Widespread belief that the rich get out of paying taxes leads respondents to believe that additional revenues intended to come from the wealthy would fall instead on the middle and lower incomes.

For another, poll respondents did not have an accurate idea of how big the current income gap is, and were in the dark concerning America’s international ranking in terms of economic equality. The authors found that although respondents were quite accurate in estimating compensation in a number of professions, they “dramatically underestimated” top executive incomes. For example, estimates of what CEOs and owners of large factories make were less than half the official estimates of actual salaries, as pieced together from a number of sources. Additionally, the margin between what respondents think executives make and what seems fair to them is considerably smaller than the margin between what respondents think executives make and what they actually make. (The authors note that respondents might have made more accurate estimates had they been asked about entertainers and athletes, rather than business-people, and that doctors’ and lawyers’ salaries are often over-estimated.)

 In a 2006 poll, the respondents optimistically gave the US a mean ranking of 15th out of 32 industrialized nations in terms of economic equality as measured by income ratios. Our actual ranking was 28th, with only Mexico, Turkey, Hong Kong and Singapore more unequal.

And for yet another, across a number of polls, respondents showed strong agreement that the possibility of earning high salaries was important to the economy as a whole, and to bringing people into professions demanding a lot of preparation. One poll found 63% agreeing that the spending of millionaires gives "employment to a lot of people," with 23% not agreeing, and 68% agreeing that investments help "create jobs and provide prosperity," with 19% disagreeing. A majority agree that no one would go through law or medical school unless they could earn substantially higher incomes than ordinary workers. So concerns about the negative economic effects of curtailing income inequality look to be part of the explanation for the lack of support for redistribution.

On the other hand, the authors found little support for the idea that Americans over-estimate their own standing on the income ladder, and none at all for David Brooks's claims that 19% of Americans believe they are in the top percentile. In one older poll, 20% ranked their families as above or far above average, and 29% as below or far below average; in a newer poll 8% ranked themselves as poor, 19% as lower income, 11% as upper income, and 2% as rich. The halves don't add up, and are skewed to the lower side. The authors note the people tend to be generous in evaluating their abilities, so perhaps there is some over-estimation, but polling evidence suggests otherwise.

 The common assumption that people over-estimate upward mobility is complicated by disparate estimations of what it means to be wealthy. One study found that those making $10K a year would require only $50K, while it would take $250K for those making around $75K, so definitions of “rich” probably include moving beyond a hand-to-mouth existence. But the authors suggest that respondents are generally quite reasonable in their expectations about becoming wealthy. Noting that 8% of households make more than $150K a year, and that one analysis of tax returns found a 50% turnover within the top 5% over ten years, the number of people who will be rich at some point is several times larger than the number who are rich at any given time. According to various polls, about 10% of respondents think it is very likely they will be rich, and about 24% that it’s somewhat likely, so they aren’t so far off.

In 2009, one set of pollsters concluded that, "Americans doggedly believe in the rags-to-riches story," but there's a problem with the question on which this conclusion is based: "Do you believe it is still possible to start out poor in this country, work hard, and become rich?" The authors point out that it's certainly possible, so the correct answer in fact is yes; people answering yes may well be acknowledging that possibility, not saying it's highly likely, just as the up to 40% who responded no were more likely commenting on the rareness of the event than the literal impossibility.

 Some have suggested that the American public tends to idolize the rich, but this was not supported in polls. First, the majority of respondents indicated they don’t find the rich that interesting, although they like to read about celebrities. A majority of respondents to an AARP poll thought being wealthy was the result of hard work rather than luck, but other polls found that percentages of people who agreed and disagreed that people worked hard for their wealth, and agreed and disagreed that the wealthy had exploited people to get where they were, were about even. Weakleim and Biggert suggest that the number of people who dismiss luck’s importance in becoming wealthy might be unrealistically high because some people may understand “luck” to “mean completely haphazard events, rather than systematic factors such as being born in a wealthy family.”

Although a majority of respondents in one poll believe millionaires give generously to charities, 49% do not believe they feel a responsibility to society because of their wealth, 78% believe them more likely to be snobs, 66% less likely to be honest, and 54% think them more likely to be racists. So, although 61% think the very rich are more likely to be physically attractive, that hasn’t translated to general merit, so admiration for the rich does not rank high as a reason that Mill’s prediction has not come to pass.

And finally the authors take on happiness. Although polls have found that large majorities believe they would be happier if they made more money, and 60% would like to be rich, only about 40% believe they would be happier if they were rich. Fifty-two percent believe the rich are no happier than they are, with only 11% thinking the rich are happier, and 35%, less happy. The authors don’t really see a contradiction here. They note that people might prefer to be rich because it would provide better benefits for their children, or that they would like to be relatively better off than they are, but not necessarily rich. In any case, the authors suggest that people are “resisting the logical consequence of the principle that money makes life better.”

Who knew?

Notes:

Income distribution data available at Emmanuel Saez’s website: http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/

If you would like to see a copy of, “America Looks at the Rich,” please get in touch with us.